The Glider Operation That Never Was. Arnhem 1944
52nd Mountain Division

Arnhem 1944: The Glider Operation That Never Was By Geoffrey Tudor Having written three articles on the exploits of 1 Mountain Regiment RA in the campaign in NW Europe in 1944/45, Geoffrey Tudor is no longer a stranger to these pages. In this article he writes about a daring operation that was planned, but never executed, in which 1 Mountain Regiment  RA may have played a leading part. In submitting the article, Geoffrey wrote: "Denis Rollo doesn't recall the topic being covered, and the Airborne Museum didn't even know that the operation had been prepared. So hopefully I haven't been wasting my time. He hasn't, and here with an interesting account of an operation that never was, supported by some fascinating load tables for glider-borne operations, are the fruits of his labours. 

Sunday Morning, 17 September. 1 Mountain Regiment RA waited in their camp on Market Rasen Racecourse in Lincolnshire. The weather was fair, and soon came the distant roar of planes from Barkeston Heath and Saltby and six other airfields in the area. Operation Market Garden was under way.  Hours dragged by as they waited for news, picturing in their minds men and gliders dropping from the skies, wondering if the day was going well. Intelligence reports had concluded that the Germans in the Arnhem area were shaken and disorganised, short of weapons, seriously demoralised: but in the event all was very different.

Elements of two SS Panzer Divisions were close by, and two of Germany's ablest Generals, Model and Bittrich. Almost from the start the lightly armed airborne troops encountered heavy weapons and armour and well-sited defences. The agonised waiting continued for two more days. Fog blanketed the airfields, hampering supply-drops and reinforcements. The vital bridge at Amhem held against bitter attacks, but the forces there were isolated and desperate for relief. 1 Mountain Regiment's role - to fly in by Dakota to Deelen Airfield (four miles north of Arnhem) - seemed increasingly unlikely. As part of 52 (Lowland) Division they had trained in Scotland for mountain warfare, forming a 'flesh-and-blood' component of the mythical 4th British Army that helped to keep large numbers of German troops tied up in Norway. Just two months earlier they had left their mules and horses in Scotland and changed to Jeeps and an air-landing role; their task, to fly in by Dakota as reinforcements to I Airborne Division.

	An Airspeed AS.51 Horsa Mk I Click to Enlarge

Wednesday, 20 September. General Hakewill-Smith, commanding 52 (Lowland) Division, was at Airborne Forces HQ following with growing unease the lack of progress at Arnhem. (Lieutenant General Browning, the force commander, was at Nijmegen and out of touch with events at Arnhem.) Hakewill-Smith realised that there was now little prospect of flying his division to Deelen Airfield - offering instead to form a brigade group to be landed by glider.

At 1800 hours, HQ 52 Division was ordered to prepare an 'if required'
plan for a small brigade group to 'assist' 1 Airborne Division. 155 Brigade (Brigadier JFS M'Laren) was to provide the infantry component, and the initial plan was set out in some detail in their war diary1:

"The situation with the British Airborne Division was serious... holding a tight perimeter defence and repelling heavy German attacks. It was proposed to organise a party to reinforce 1st British Airborne Division in the Arnhem area. The GOC had outlined the plan to the GSO I (Ops) 52 Division by phone from HQ Airborne Troops and the outline organisation decided was: a modified brigade HQ, two three-company battalions, one composite artillery regiment consisting of one troop of 25-pounders, one battery and one troop of 3.7-inch howitzers (mountain artillery) and one 6-pounder anti-tank battery together with a medical detachment from (?) Field Dressing Station. The exact composition of the force was to be worked out, load manifest summaries prepared and the whole party to be at four hours notice to move with effect from 0001 hours, 22 September '44."

At a further conference at 2330 hours it was confirmed that 4 KOSB and 5 KOSB would be the battalions involved. Meanwhile the artillery component was being worked out, as described in the HQRA war diary: "It was decided to send a large brigade group to bolster up I Airborne Division in gliders. RA element was to consist of one troop of 25-pounders (B Troop, 80 Field Regiment RA), 452 Mountain Battery RA, (both under command Major J. Fairclough, 452 Mountain Battery RA) and 215 Anti-Tank Battery RA." (The 2IC of 80 Field Regiment RA was to leave for Netheravon at 2100 hours to learn about the loading and lashing of artillery equipment in Horsa and Waco gliders.)

Wednesday 21 September. The mountain gunners moved from agonised waiting to frantic action. The regimental war diary records this laconically: "21/22 Glider-borne operation planned. Composite 18 gun battery to support two battalions of 155 Brigade in relief of Arnhem forces."

At 0900 hours the CRA held a conference for the units concerned. During the night many details had already been decided, based on the 50 Horsa and 44 Waco gliders known to be available. It was confirmed that one troop of 474 Mountain Battery RA was to be included in the force, and details of personnel, Jeeps, guns and ammunition were specified. All units were to be at four hours notice from 2359 hours.

The war diary of 155 Brigade takes up the story: "1700 hours GOC 52 Division held a final conference at divisional HQ and confirmed the composition of the force. RASC troop to carry personnel to airfields arrived at 4 KOSB (41 vehicles) 5 KOSB (41 vehicles) and Brigade HQ (four vehicles). No definite positions for the LZ were known, but three were under consideration."

	Detail showing the steering wheel attached to the vehicle. Click to Enlarge

Thursday 22 September. 1 Mountain Regiment RA drew up final orders for the operation. The artillery component had again been increased: 452 Battery and 474 Battery, together with one section of 451 Battery would form the 18-gun mountain battery. This would be commanded by Major John Fairclough of 452 Battery, with Major EW Cameron of 474 Battery as 2IC.  (Presumably further gliders had been located, while experience both in Normandy and in the Arnhem operation gave an indication of probable casualty rate. It was likely that between eight and 10 guns out of a force of 18, flown in by glider, would survive the flight and the landing and be brought into action. Hence it was stark realism to send the augmented battery of 18 guns into the battle and to provide three gun-position officers for each six-gun troop.) Vehicles were to be packed and moved to 452 Battery lines by 1600 hours, there would be a conference for all officers at 2100 hours, and a drill order at 0900 hours the following day. All personnel were at four hours notice to move and were confined to barracks - though (shades of the Duchess of Richmond's Ball before Waterloo), 'The dance at Market Rasen will be considered as within camp bounds'. During the morning there was careful checking of all equipment and stores to be carried, and at 1300 hours, the HQRA war diary records: "1 Mountain Regiment RA and 80 Field Regtiment RA  practised loading of 3.7-inch howitzers and 25-pounders into Horsa glider at Barkeston Heath aerodrome.

Very soon the mountain gunners were reminded of the mythical battle that was lost 'all for the sake of a horseshoe nail'. The Horsa glider had been designed way back in 1940 to carry General Dill's proposed 'Aerodrome Capture Groups' with the 3.7-inch howitzer as the artillery component. While design work was proceeding at London Colne, 1 Mountain Regiment RA sent a gun there for evaluation on 21 March, 1941, so there was no problem over loading the gun. The Horsa was first flew on 12 September 1941. It proved successful, and 3,655 were built, taking part in all the major airborne landings. Unfortunately the Jeep was not yet in service in Britain when the Horsa was developed, and several modifications were required for the airborne version of the Jeep. The mountain gunners quickly discovered the biggest snag - that the steering wheel of their Jeeps fouled by a few inches the spar that crossed the top of the fuselage to link the two wings. (Partly deflating the tyres failed to solve the problem.) An airborne regiment jeep standing nearby provided the answer: its steering column had been modified so that the steering wheel could be removed during transit and rapidly replaced on unloading.

Without this modification (pictured below)  there was no way in which the mountain artillery Jeeps could be loaded - but it was events elsewhere that decided the issue. This was a short-lived operation, for the regimental war diary records for 22 September: Glider operation cancelled. General Browning, the Airborne Corps Commander, in communication at last, had decided the glider-drop was not needed:
"Thank you for your message, but offer not - repeat not - required as situation better than you think. We want lifts as already planned, including Poles. Second Army definitely requires your party and intend to fly you to Deelen airfield." Since it was never remotely possible to fly to Deelen this was the end of the road for the mountain gunners, so far as airborne operations were concerned. Had a contingency plan for a glider-borne landing been prepared in advance (with Jeeps modified for a glider-borne role) a reinforcement of this size would have been valuable and possibly even decisive.

	Detail showing the steering wheel removed. Click to Enlarge

Few writers have considered the possibility of glider-borne reinforcement: an exception is Martin Middlebrook in his book Arnhem 1944, described by General Sir John Hackett as 'without question the best book so far published on the Market Garden operation'. Middlebrook suggested that '...the Brigade could have been landed north of the Rhine where it could have reinforced the Oosterbeek perimeter and provided Urquhart with sufficient reserves to defend the Westerbouwing heights [commanding the British positions] properly'. This would have been reinforcement on a different scale from the handful of Poles and Dorsets who made the crossing by boat from the south bank. This was the very area held most thinly by the Germans, and where they feared a break-out attempt by the remaining airborne troops. Robert J Kershaw's detailed study of German troop movements provides confirmation2. In command of troops drafted into this sector was SS-Colonel Hans Lippert, commandant of the SS Unteroffizierschule Arnheim. By now his forces were depleted and exhausted and there were virtually no reserves. Lippert told Kershaw: "It remained a puzzle why the Polish Brigade did not come over the Rhine and attack the battle group in our rear. The north bank of the Rhine from Heelsum to Wageningen was only occupied by Territorial Army soldiers. A crossing in this sector would have been a walk-over... the costly battle of the previous few days had already resulted in gaps in my front line, and there were no further reserves available."

Yet another factor was the presence in this area of the very effective Belgian SAS team under Lieutenant GS Kirschen. Though dropped later than intended, Kirschen's party quickly formed links with the Dutch Resistance, as described in his book Six Friends Arrive Tonight, 1949.  'We got down to work. We started off by establishing a huge information network... Local groups in the region were ordered to send in a daily report on enemy movements and positions'. Here are examples, from the airborne forces war diary, of messages sent by Kirschen's team:

21 September: 900 Dutch SS in position 3 miles east of EDE. Flak guns south of church Elst E 4998. Airfield Soesterberg E 39 occupied by demolition troops runways mined. 12 trucks full of troops via Doorn E 38 to Arnhem E 77.

22 September: Batteries reported east of Rhenen E 47 moved now east to Zetten E 6275. Railway bridge at Rhenen being mined. Battery position dug at Driesprong E 6188.
Nor was this the end of the SAS contribution. With the aid of brave civilians and the Dutch Resistance, 140 airborne 'evaders' were collected together and taken across the rivers to safety late in October.

By 26 September the original Deelen operation - Operation Patience - was postponed indefinitely: this was the day when the remnants of 1 Airborne Division were withdrawn. It remains an intriguing thought, however, that for three-quarters of 1 Mountain Regiment RA their first- and possibly only - operation might have been a 'death or glory' descent to join the Arnhem battle. It would have been a tough baptism of fire; and yet a few weeks later, in the Waicheren operation, the mountain gunners demonstrated how they could cope with new and challenging situations.

	Loading supplies into the "Horsa" Glider. Click to Enlarge

It is also worth recalling that on the German side mountain troops had shown their adaptability. In Crete it had been Ringel's 5th Mountain Division, substituted late in the day for 22nd Air Landing Division, that won the German victory. Alan Clarke, The Fall of Crete, 1962, described the effects of Ringel's presence. 'His arrival was a move to regularise the situation, and although there were many senior German officers who still doubted the value and practicability of the whole affair, at least when Ringel took command it became professional business. For now, although Lohr (IV Air Fleet) still held nominal command, executive control was taken out of the hands of the Luftwaffe and had become a Wehrmacht responsibility. Ringel lost no time in asserting his authority over the parachutists'. With aircraft being turned round every three minutes, the arrival of mountain artillery, anti-tank guns and mortars swung the battle in favour of the Germans.
This was another battle where mountain gunners won the day.
 
Notes:
  1.  For ease of reading all abbreviations used in the original war diary (and all other military documents quoted from in this article) have been spelt out in full.
  2. It Never Snows in September, the German View of Market Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944.
Loading Lists:
In the days leading up to the operation detailed planning was carried out by the staff of HQRA 52 (Lowland) Division. This included drawing up loading lists for each type of vehicle and trailer. Here we show three of the loading lists. Each 3.7-inch howitzer ended up with 64 rounds of ammunition; 56 HE and 8 HEAT anti-tank.