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Operation MarketGarden“There has been no single performance by any unit that has more greatly inspired me or more excited my admiration than the nine-day action by the 1st British Parachute Division between 17th and 25th September.” The Allied invasion of Occupied Europe started on 6th June 1944. Although the landings by sea, glider and parachute initially went well, the advance on the ground was slowed by the German defenders. The Allies eventually broke out, and by the autumn were approaching the borders of Germany. Progress again slowed due to the tenacity of the Germans in their well-prepared defences. A bold plan was therefore proposed by General Montgomery to kick-start the Allied advance and take it into the German industrial heartland, thus shortening the war. He planned to out-flank the defences of the Siegfried Line and, leaping over three natural water barriers, the Maas at Grave, the Waal at Nijmegan and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem (as well as several smaller rivers and canals), secure positions that would enable a major advance to be made to the east into Germany.
Montgomery envisaged “the laying of a carpet of airborne troops across the waterways” to enable Allied ground forces to move forward. The bridges across the Maas and Waal were to be secured by the US 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, and that at Arnhem by the British 1st Airborne Division. The operation was to be codenamed “Market Garden,” with “Market” covering its airborne elements and “Garden” the ground forces. Timing was to be critical, and the plan was that the lightly-armed airborne troops were, with the element of surprise, expected to take and hold their objectives for a maximum of two days before being relieved by the troops of the 2nd Army, who would advance up a 64-mile corridor along the Eindhoven-Arnhem road. A complication was that there were insufficient Allied transport aircraft available to take the airborne force in one lift, and with priority being given to the US airborne divisions (who were to capture the first bridges), the British paratroops, who had the furthest to go, were allocated the fewest aircraft. Only the 1st Parachute Brigade, 1st Air-landing Brigade, plus Divisional HQ and support arms, could be carried in the initial lift; the 4th Para Brigade and the 1st Polish Para Brigade would drop on D+2 and D+3. Only half the division would therefore benefit from surprise and as most of the Air-landing Brigade were to secure the Drop Zones (DZs) and Landing Zones (LZs), only the 1st Para Brigade would be available to take the Arnhem Bridge. A further complication was that there were no LZs or DZs close the bridge, the nearest ones being between five and eight miles away to the west. Also, information that the 9th and 10th Panzer Divisions were refitting in the area were discounted. D-Day was Sunday 17th September, and at H-Hour, 1300 hours, the first main lift to Arnhem took off from several 38 Group airfields, including Keevil and Blakehill Farm in Wiltshire. This was composed of 320 tug/glider combinations, and were preceded by a Pathfinder Force of twelve Stirlings from Keevil that dropped the 21st Independent Parachute Company to mark the LZs and DZs. In addition, 38 tug/gliders had been despatched to Nijmegen with General Browning and the HQ of 1st Airborne Corps aboard. Meanwhile, C-47s of the USAAF also carried US paratroops to attack the other bridges, including those of the 437th Troop Carrier Group based at Ramsbury in Wiltshire, which took troops of 101st Airborne Division to Zon near Eindhoven to take the Wilhelmina Canal crossing. On that morning 4,287 British and US aircraft took off, including 500 gliders, along with 1,240 fighters and 1,113 bombers to support the landings.
The landings initially went well. At Arnhem, despite running into German pockets of resistance on their trek in from the LZs, troops of the 2nd Batallion, under Lt.Col.John Frost were able to capture the north end of the bridge, and a Divisional HQ was set up at the Hartenstein Hotel at Oosterbeek on the edge of the town. The Germans probed the British defences that night, and the following morning a column of five armoured cars and six half-tracks attempted to rush the bridge from the south. All were knocked out by the paras’ 6-pounder AT and PIAT guns, blocking the bridge and preventing the Germans from reinforcing their troops defending the Nijmegen Bridge. The troops of the second lift landed in 269 gliders on the 18th but immediately found themselves on the defensive as the Germans attacked the LZs. The paras fought their way through in their attempts to reach the bridge. Despite bad weather on the third day, 35 gliders landed carrying elements of 1st Polish Brigade, and that afternoon 163 transport aircraft of 38 and 46 Groups arrived to re-supply the beleaguered troops. They met heavy resistance and with great courage the RAF pilots flew through a barrage of flak to deliver their precious cargoes, 13 aircraft being shot down and 97 damaged. Tragically, because of a breakdown in radio communication, the paras on the ground were unable to tell the RAF crews that the DZs had been overrun, and of the 390 tons of ammunition, food and medical supplies dropped, only 31 tons were received by 1st Airborne. It was on this day that Flt.Lt.David Lord, captain of a Dakota of 271 Sqn, was awarded a posthumous VC after being shot down while dropping supplies. Four other VCs were awarded at Arnhem, to members of 1st Airborne Division.
With his command being fragmented and sustaining heavy losses, on the 20th Maj.Gen.Robert Uruqhart, in overall command of the Division, ordered his troops to pull back to form a defensive perimeter around his HQ, while having to leave Frost’s isolated battalion to fend for itself. Hopes among Col.Frost’s men at the bridge ran high when news came on the morning of the 20th that 2nd Army was on its way. However, no help came, and under increased enemy attacks, sustaining heavy casualties and running out of ammunition, they surrendered. With the bridge gone the fragmented Airborne battalions held a perimeter that had shrunk to the western edge of Oosterbeek with a toe-hold on the river-bank, but they held on for four days more. Hungry, thirsty and taking more and more casualties, they drove off attack after attack. Attempts to re-supply them were tragically doomed. Still unaware that the DZs had fallen into enemy hands, RAF pilots flew through walls of flak to drop supplies, but less than 8% of the stores dropped were recovered by the paras. Meanwhile the US Airborne Divisions had dropped as planned on the 17th, and the 2nd Army had begun its advance. The 101st seized most of their objectives, but found one bridge destroyed. Engineers of the Guards Armoured Division built a replacement and they pressed on towards Grave to relieve the 82nd. The latter had been driven back from the River Waal bridge north of Nijmegen, but it was recaptured by Guards Armoured and the 504th US Parachute Regiment. German counter-attacks near Grave then slowed the 2nd Army’s advance, but the 43rd Infantry Division took the lead and succeeded in reaching Polish paras that had been dropped south of the Nieder Rijn.
Despite the valiant efforts of the besieged airborne troops on the ground and the airmen who fought to protect and support them, with such heavy losses the Arnhem operation could not be sustained. It was therefore decided to withdraw the paras to the south bank of the river. On the night of 25th September the remnants of 1st Airborne were ferried across the Neder Rijn. Of the 10,005 men of the division landed at Arnhem, 2,163 escaped. Despite the fact that the operation was ultimately unsuccessful, Market Garden was a considerable achievement. During the first four days of the operation the RAF flew 660 gliders, 95 guns, 544 jeeps and carriers with 10,005 paras and glider-borne troops 60 miles behind enemy lines. The lightly-armed force was meant to hold out for two days – in the event they held out for nine days, despite heavy enemy opposition from overwhelming numbers of seasoned troops, including armoured units. That the operation ultimately ended in withdrawal does not detract from that tremendous achievement. Article compiled by Dave Berryman, author of ‘Wiltshire Airfields in the Second World War,’ published by Countryside Books.
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