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40th Anniversary event by Kennet Valley Area of the MVT
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52nd Highland Division

The Royal Air Force & Op Market / Garden

Stirling Bombers drop surplies for Operation Market-Garden
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The successes of the campaign in France and Belgium had enabled planning staff within the RAF to react effectively to changes in tactics and priorities. So, when on the 10th September 1944 the Operational Order for the Op MARKET was agreed, the planning staff of the RAF found themselves rapidly tailoring existing plans in order to meet the deadline. One such plan was Operation LINNET, a large deployment of tactical airborne forces behind enemy lines which was never launched. Whilst all plans accept an element of risk, there was still a lack of understanding in the relationship between risk and consequence regarding the unique requirements of Airborne Operations by both the military and aviation commanders involved.

The original plan called for tug aircraft to tow two gliders but due to the distances required for Op MARKET the tugs could only tow a single glider. This now meant that it would take three separate ‘lifts’ to deploy the full assault force (2/3 by parachute and 1/3 by glider). The RAF only had 485 Transport Aircraft and 876 Gliders but was backed by an incredible US 1,274 C-47 Dakotas and 2,160 Waco Hadrian Gliders. The decision (accepted by all) to do 3 lifts on consecutive days was one of the big gambles in the plan as it relied on the weather staying clear enough to be able to carry out the lifts and the necessary re-supply flights.

Another consideration was the anticipated losses caused by the deadly German anti-aircraft fire. As the drops had to be carried out in daylight the pessimists predicted that up to 40% of the Air Transport fleet would be lost. This concern, along with the lack of suitable Landing and Drop Zones in the vicinity of the Arnhem Bridge, led to the acceptance of some LZ and DZ being up to eight miles from the target bridges.

An intensive reconnaissance of all target areas was ordered but the liaison between the Intelligence services and the hard pressed RAF Photographic Reconnaissance Units was never fully established. Bad weather further hampered this vital task, resulting in the failure to detect the steadily increasing German strength.

Stirling Bombers and a Horsa Glider prepare for take off.
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One other area which was never formally ratified was the co-operation between the Tactical Air Forces, and British Airborne units. The combination of ground forces guarded and assisted by close support air power, which was working so well for 30 Corps, had not been adopted by the Airborne Forces who were content to let the bulk of the air support be allocated to the Op GARDEN. For example, the Irish Guards forward group had with them RAF Forward Air Controllers. Their task was to pass instructions to the waiting 'cab-rank' of 83 Group Hawker Typhoons circling overhead. After crossing the Belgium border with Holland, in a one hour period, the RAF officers called in 230 individual strikes on five miles of road and the immediate surrounding area. The Guards fired red smoke shells to indicate target areas, whilst troop leaders threw yellow smoke grenades to indicate their own position to the pilots approaching at over 200 mph. Clearly, troops did not completely trust the fluorescent orange air identification panels positioned on the rear of each vehicle! With smoke and radio orders pin-pointing their targets, the Typhoons' rocket and cannon fire proved extremely effective. This level of support was never available to the Paras at Arnhem.

Sixty four years later and with the benefit of hindsight, we all accept that the plan was fatally flawed and only ever stood a very slim chance of success. None the less, on the 17th of September - seven days after getting the word to go – 1,545 Para-Troop carrying aircraft accompanied by 451 Glider Tugs and Gliders, escorted by over 1,130 Allied fighter aircraft, departed from their bases in the UK bound for Holland. In spite of the set-backs, a huge level of support from the RAF was constantly maintained for the next seven days, with the only RAF VC awarded for MARKET/GARDEN going, posthumously, to F/L David Lord – a Dakota pilot.